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Asia-Pacific needs a new regional architecture inclusive of all members that ensures indivisible, relative and sustainable security

Editor's note: The world has undergone many changes and shocks in recent years. Enhanced dialogue between scholars from China and overseas is needed to build mutual understanding on many problems the world faces. For this purpose, the China Watch Institute of China Daily and the National Institute for Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, jointly present this special column: The Global Strategy Dialogue, in which experts from China and abroad will offer insightful views, analysis and fresh perspectives on long-term strategic issues of global importance.

In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region underwent a rapid change. The rise of China and the United States' corresponding strategic shift to the East has resulted in a bipolar confrontation in the region, with a trend toward the ideologicalization and politicization of economic problems.

The way Asia-Pacific countries interact with each other has also changed. As the Joe Biden administration strengthens the US' alliance network and intensifies the containment and counterbalancing of China, including intervening in the Taiwan question, Asia-Pacific countries are facing growing pressure to choose sides. Tensions in the region, especially in East Asia, have started to become real, with an increased risk that "soft conflicts" in economy and technology will turn into military "hard conflicts".

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is the largest geopolitical event since the end of the Cold War. Although it originated from the escalation of geopolitical tensions in Europe, it has exerted broad and profound impacts on relations among the major powers and regional situations, which are also prominently reflected in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Ukraine crisis has intensified contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region and triggered a series of acute issues.

First, the stability of industry chains and supply chains. The most direct impact of the Ukraine crisis is on food and energy supply stability. Over the past few decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of economic globalization. Therefore, it has been hit the hardest by this spillover effect of the conflict, with economies, societies and regional cooperation affected to varying degrees.

Second, the strategic mindset of countries in the region. An increasing number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region tend to be conservative and negative about the regional situation, with an enhanced sense of self-reliance in terms of security. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, some small and medium-sized countries have asked themselves, "If our country faces similar impacts and threats in the future, who can we trust for help?" As a result, while they strengthen diplomatic maneuvering, they are also developing greater autonomy in national security.

Third, the strategic policies of relevant countries. Amid the uncertainties, some countries have made unprecedented adjustments. For example, after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe openly stated that Japan should seek "nuclear sharing "with the US. For the first time in history, the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea attended a NATO summit. There is also a clearer trend to connect the US Asia-Pacific alliance system with NATO.

As a hotspot for the rivalry among the major powers, the Asia-Pacific region faces a set of new issues, challenges and risks, and needs to pay attention to the following three trends.

First, bloc confrontation. The US was once the leader in building the postwar international system and the Asia-Pacific regional order, but it is now increasingly using approaches outside these established systems to achieve its strategic goals. While it strengthens bilateral alliances, the US is also trying to form regional groups that exclude China, such as the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity", which are closely followed by Japan and the ROK.

Facilitated by the US, Japan and the ROK have realized a dramatic improvement in their relations. Although the sustainability of such externally driven progress is questionable, it has already encouraged bloc confrontation within the region.

During the 28th Nikkei Forum on the Future of Asia at the end of May, on a panel discussion around the global impact of the China-Japan relationship, the moderator asked whether China feels pressure from the closer relationship between Japan and the ROK. This question implied the target of US-Japan-ROK cooperation and the regional political implications it has caused.

Second, arms races. Even before the Ukraine crisis, the Asia-Pacific region had shown a clear upward trend in military expenditures and weapons acquisitions. The conflict has spurred some countries to strengthen their defense capabilities while enhancing cooperation with the US.

Nuclear weapons are much less likely to be abandoned. As the US promotes security cooperation with the United Kingdom and Australia, it has deployed strategic nuclear submarines in Northeast Asia for the first time in 40 years, resulting in significant changes in regional nuclear proliferation.

Third, the Ukraine crisis highlights three confrontations regarding the post-World War II order in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender that accepted them marked the starting of the postwar regional order. However, the San Francisco Peace Treaty made major modifications to the key contents of these three agreements, which distorted the regional order and created a series of disputes.

Second, the San Francisco system was by no means an inheritance and extension of the Yalta system. Rather, it is a distortion and alteration.

Third, the legal basis for Japan's involvement in the Taiwan question and its demand for a "peaceful resolution" from China is the theory of the "undetermined status of Taiwan" originated from the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which China refuses to acknowledge.

Amid the Ukraine crisis, the international situation has become more complex, and the factors influencing the balance of power have become more diverse, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

Faced with unprecedented challenges, it is imperative that China adhere unwaveringly to major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and its neighborhood diplomacy, and it remains steadfast in trying to achieve its regional strategic objectives.

Economically, it is necessary to prevent the formation of two separate markets and supply chain systems that are disconnected from each other. Decoupling should be firmly opposed.

In terms of security, it is necessary to prevent the polarization of the regional security landscape and avoid bloc confrontation. Efforts should be made to promote the historical process of stable reconstruction of the regional order, ultimately establishing a new order that allows equal participation, reflects the demands of all parties and integrates their interests.

On the Ukraine crisis, China's position is not determined by the closeness or distance of its relationship with the parties involved, but based on the merits of the issue. It insists that the crisis should be settled by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation, and advocates that the reasonable security interests and concerns of all countries should be respected and appropriately addressed.

In the long run, the Asia-Pacific region should strive to build a unified pan-regional security architecture, which should include all regional members, and should be non-exclusive and non-discriminatory toward any party. It should embody the concept of indivisible, relative and sustainable security. Only such an architecture can be called an "order", rather than a "system".

The author is the director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a researcher of the National Institute for Global Strategy at the CASS. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.