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          Damage control

          China needs to formulate a comprehensive response strategy to gain more initiative in the global technological competition

          By CAI CUIHONG and ZHANG RUOYANG | China Daily Global | Updated: 2025-02-18 09:35
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          LI MIN/CHINA DAILY

          China needs to formulate a comprehensive response strategy to gain more initiative in the global technological competition

          As countries around the world accelerate their strategic technological deployments, traditional global geopolitics are shifting toward "techno-politics". That is, with the unprecedented rise in the role of technology and under the logic of international political competition, the organizational structures and behavioral patterns of nations, as well as the means and content of major power competition, are undergoing significant changes. Technological factors have become core variables in economic competition, national security and even ideological confrontation.

          Technological innovation and industrial transformation are key forces shaping the global development landscape and competitive dynamics, while geopolitical factors influence or even dictate technological development. Against this backdrop, the global technological competition exhibits three prominent characteristics.

          First, a new nationwide resource mobilization system aimed at achieving breakthroughs in core technologies across key fields has been strengthened.

          Given that technological development entails high risks and high rewards, the State-led, socially engaged model of large-scale scientific research, technological breakthroughs, talent cultivation and industrial planning has become more pronounced.

          For example, the United States has increased its investment in semiconductor R&D through the CHIPS and Science Act, while the European Union has adopted the European Chips Act to reduce reliance on external supply chains. In emerging technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and life sciences, countries across the globe are strengthening national-level R&D plans to compete for technological leadership.

          Second, technology competition is increasingly intertwined with security concerns and ideological considerations.

          Technology now plays a pivotal role in national security, value systems and international influence, particularly in strategic fields such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. To vie for dominance in technological systems, Western countries, led by the US, frequently cite risks such as "tech leakage" and "economic coercion", hyping the so-called China threat. They aim to conflate security, economic, technological and even scientific issues to further constrain competitors in the latest wave of global technological revolution and industrial transformation, thereby consolidating their dominance in emerging technologies.

          Furthermore, the US has incorporated technologies such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence into its national security framework, tightened export restrictions on critical technologies to China, and pressured its allies to join a "de-risking" alliance aimed at curbing China's technological development through systematic blockades.

          Third, competition over technological ecosystems has intensified.

          Future technological competition will extend beyond the advancement of individual technologies. More importantly, it will encompass entire technological ecosystems, including technological standards, supply chains and the integration of talent and market resources.

          Under the pretext of "de-risking", some Western countries have recalibrated their economic and technological relations with China by implementing policies that promote selective decoupling. As a result, the global technological landscape faces increasing fragmentation, with some technological fields already exhibiting signs of systemic division.

          Facing this challenging landscape, China needs to formulate a comprehensive response strategy to safeguard its technological development and strive to gain more initiative in the global technological competition.

          First, China should fortify its independent innovation system to accelerate breakthroughs in core technologies.

          Currently, the epicenter of global technological competition lies in basic research and achieving breakthroughs in core technologies. China should increase investment in strategic and forward-looking technologies while promoting synergy between basic science and applied technology. The government should further bolster self-reliance and controllability of technological R&D by scaling up dedicated funds, optimizing research management systems and deepening industry-academia-research collaboration.

          Additionally, China needs to build a robust technological reserve, focusing on next-generation information technologies, advanced manufacturing and renewable energy, etc. to secure a long term competitive edge in the technological revolution.

          Second, China needs to advance tech diplomacy to build an open and inclusive international technological cooperation system.

          Against the backdrop of an increasingly fragmented global technological landscape, China should adopt a more proactive approach to deepen interaction with the global innovation system.

          On the one hand, China should broaden technological cooperation with developing countries and emerging markets, especially under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. On the other hand, China should take on a more active role in global technological standard setting, international research collaborations, and joint innovation efforts. Expanding its network of technological partnership will help China mitigate the risks of isolation imposed by technological blockades.

          Third, China needs to strengthen the resilience of the domestic industrial chains and enhance the competitiveness of its technological ecosystem.

          Future technological competition will involve not only specific technological capabilities but also the integration of entire technological ecosystems. Therefore, China must strengthen the coordinated development of upstream and downstream industrial chains and improve the self-sufficiency of its supply chains.

          For example, in the semiconductor industry, China should beef up support for the entire industrial chain, including chip design, manufacturing and packaging, to enhance self-sufficiency and technological autonomy. Additionally, it is imperative to promote the greater alignment of domestic technological standards with international standards to ensure China's voice in the global technological system.

          Last but not least, China should push back against the increasing overuse of security rhetoric in technological competition and pioneer a more balanced model of technological governance.

          Amid escalating technological restrictions imposed by the US and its allies, China should enhance the transparency and global credibility of its tech policies while promoting a fairer and more inclusive model of technological cooperation.

          By formulating more competitive policies on data security and AI ethics, China can enhance global trust in its technological system and improve global market confidence in Chinese technology.

          China needs to ensure technological self-reliance while simultaneously fostering a more open, inclusive and cooperative global technological system. By strengthening independent innovation, optimizing technological governance, deepening international cooperation, and improving its industrial chain ecosystem, China can seize greater strategic initiative in reshaping the future of global technological competition and advance a fairer, more sustainable model of global technological cooperation.

          Cai Cuihong is a professor at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. Zhang Ruoyang is a doctoral student at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University.

          The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

          Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.

           

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