EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument underscores rules-based international order

Recent tariff threats by the US in connection with Greenland have prompted renewed discussion within the European Union about the possible use of its Anti-Coercion Instrument. While the instrument has yet to be activated, the debate itself highlights a broader and more consequential issue: the growing tension between unilateral, power-based approaches and the principles of sovereignty and multilateralism that underpin the post-World War II international order.

At issue is not merely a trade dispute. Economic pressure used to pursue political or territorial objectives risks undermining core norms of international relations, including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination. These principles remain central to global stability and are enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

Greenland's legal and constitutional status is well established under international law. In 1953, Denmark formally informed the United Nations that Greenland had become an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark, with representation in national political institutions. Subsequent developments further clarified Greenland's autonomy and political identity. The 1979 Home Rule Act and the 2009 Self-Government Act transferred nearly all governing powers to Greenlandic authorities, while defense, monetary policy, and foreign affairs remain the responsibility of Denmark. Importantly, these arrangements recognize the Greenlandic people as a subject of self-determination, including the right to decide their future political status.

Against this legal background, any external pressure implying a transfer of territory is inconsistent with established principles of international law. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are not matters to be negotiated through economic coercion, but issues governed by multilateral rules and the freely expressed will of the people concerned.

The EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument, which entered into force in December 2023, provides a legal framework for responding to economic coercion by non-EU countries. The instrument authorizes proportionate countermeasures, including restrictions on market access, public procurement, investment, and trade in services. Its primary objective is deterrence and the preservation of policy autonomy, rather than escalation.

The ACI operates within a rules-based and consultative decision-making process. Its activation requires assessment, coordination, and consensus among EU member states. Although the instrument has been dubbed the EU's trade "bazooka", it would take considerable time and unity, which may be difficult to achieve. Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade and Rapporteur for this instrument, estimated that the process from the beginning of the investigation to the imposition of measures might take about six months. This reflects the EU's broader preference for restraint, predictability, and dialogue in managing external economic pressure.

The ACI should therefore be understood as part of a wider effort to defend multilateral norms and international law, rather than as a tool for confrontation that undermines the union "to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples and the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter."

The broader implications of the current debate extend beyond the transatlantic relationship. The approach taken by the US signals a departure from the established rules-based international order. What is at stake is the revival of historical power politics, as some observers have described it — a so-called Donroe Doctrine — a personalized and unilateral reinterpretation of power politics, in which economic pressure and strategic leverage are elevated above institutional constraints and international law.

Following the US' approach, international rules are treated as flexible instruments rather than binding commitments, while multilateral institutions are viewed as optional rather than foundational. Such an approach risks normalizing a return to pre–World War I patterns of international relations, in which major powers impose their will within perceived spheres of influence and smaller actors face limited room for autonomous choice. Over time, this tendency erodes trust in international institutions and weakens the collective capacity to manage disputes through law, dialogue, and cooperation.

Recent experience suggests that dialogue and consultation remain the most effective means of resolving differences. Engagement between China and the EU on trade issues, including discussions related to electric vehicle imports, demonstrates that disputes can be managed through non-discrimination, objective assessment, and respect for established rules.

In an increasingly complicated international environment, upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter and the postwar multilateral system remains essential. International institutions should continue to evolve to reflect changing global realities, but reform must be grounded in respect for sovereignty, equality among states, and the rule of law. Economic relations should serve as a bridge for cooperation rather than a tool for coercion. Commitment to multilateralism, restraint, and dialogue is indispensable for maintaining a stable, fair, and predictable international order.

The author is with the Brussels Research Institute on Development, Governance and Empowerment.

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