Changing climate of global power balance

The global financial crisis that originated in the US has hurt the world's economic development and altered the international power balance in such a way that it is no longer to the sole advantage of developed countries. This historic shift will accelerate the "quantitative change process" of our times.

With globalization and information technology developing by leaps and bounds and given the universality of non-traditional security threats, there has a marked rise in the interdependence among countries, including the developing and the developed. Global coordination and positive interaction has been intensified substantially, too, in addressing a variety of global challenges such as the financial crisis, climate change and terrorism.

A series of contradictions and conflicts are unprecedentedly complicated and incisive in terms of the competition of comprehensive national strengths, "self-determination" and "counter self-determination". There also exist different directions of "change", policy orientation and interest preference in dealing with threats and challenges, especially in maintaining and opposing international monopoly status.

This situation has thrown up four apparent signs of development tendencies, and created new challenges for China's diplomatic policy.

First, the rise of major developing countries has overshadowed the "club of wealthy countries". French President Nicolas Sarkozy talked about "the era of relative powers" at the beginning of 2008. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and World Bank President Robert Zoellick both have said international institutions, such as G8 and IMF, must "reflect" the rise of developing countries, and the "club of wealthy nations", which is no longer working, must include China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Russia for it to operate effectively.

Some far-sighted people in the US, too, acknowledge that "the world has changed", "the force of globalization is shaping a world order that makes the US subject to more restraint" and "a system of multipolarization has come forth, which is a reality dominating today's world".

On his part, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has said that because of the US-led war in Iraq and the global financial crisis, the days of an America-dominated world order is coming to an end and we are stepping into an era of multi-polarization.

Against this background, G20 is representative of the changing times. There have been talks about a G2, G3 and G4, too, which signal not only the interaction between the developed and developing countries, but also the exploration of different compositions of emerging countries.

Second, the debate on "Washington Consensus" and "Beijing Consensus" is getting hot, reflecting people's perspective worldwide. After the global financial crisis, the "US model", with its insurmountable drawbacks, is being viewed with suspicion. Some American academics have said that the "US model" is not foolproof and needs to be reviewed.

The "China model", on the other hand, is drawing more attention. More and more people believe it has its merits in terms of being independent from other models, formulation of policies to suit national conditions, and high capability of adjustment and adaptation. This change in global public opinion reflects the "the changing of our times" and deserves our scientific response.

Third, with moderate politicians like Barack Obama and Hatoyama coming to power in the US and Japan, more positive signs could be expected from the international community. Obama has acknowledged that the US cannot address major international issues alone. It needs its allies' help and cooperation of new partners to do so, he has said, for which the international financial system should be reformed and G20 should replace G8.

Hatoyama has demanded a more equal status for Tokyo in its dealings with Washington in order to make Japan a bridge connecting the East and the West. He has promised to pay more attention to his neighboring countries, too.

These changes in policy and tactics are a good omen for China, Asia and the course of world peace and development. This is a strategic opportunity which China and other countries should cash in on to further advance bilateral and multilateral ties and direct the "changing times" toward peace and development.

Fourth, the diversification of other countries' currencies has begun to thwart the status of the US dollar. The past three G20 meetings have played a positive role in weathering the global financial crisis. But a true recovery is still far off, as is the much-needed reform of the international financial system.

On the one hand, the global financial crisis has put a question mark on the supremacy of the US dollar. The sovereign wealth funds of "BRIC" (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the Gulf states are developing fast. Hong Kong, Dubai and even Shanghai are playing the role of international financial hubs. And countries are opting for more alternative currencies as international reserve.

On the other, financial system reform has not touched the core issue, even though the US has spoken a lot about it. Significant progress has been made in giving more voice to emerging economies, but the US still holds the "veto power" in international financial matters. This has to change.

Most of the countries have been mulling what to do in the "post-financial crisis" period, focusing mainly on whether to choose or readjust their "development models", and toying with new economic and financial policies, realignment of combinations and competitions of major powers and engaging in technological innovation.

Do we need more proof of a historic shift in global power balance?

(China Daily 12/29/2009 page9)