Taking corruption by the horns

Xi's clean governance campaign has yielded positive results but institutional measures are needed so officials put people first

One of the most widely discussed issues since Xi Jinping assumed China's leadership has been his call for a war on corruption. On becoming president, Xi launched a one-year "mass line" in June with special emphasis on the war against corruption, which included measures to curb red tape and improve the Party's work style to bring officials closer to the people. So how has the anti-corruption drive fared in the past year?

Anti-corruption drives are not new to China, but Xi's crusade seems different from earlier ones, and there are several reasons for this. First, as some scholars have argued, as the son of Xi Zhongxun, one of the first generation revolutionaries, Xi has a lot more at stake in terms of enhancing and reaffirming the leadership of the Party. And having envisioned the China Dream, he needs to convey to the people that he is serious about tackling the scourge of corruption.

Second, having taken over the leadership from Hu Jintao, who set forth the "Scientific Outlook on Development", Xi has made it clear that the leap made from "economic governance" to "social governance" is an irreversible political development, and the anti-corruption drive is an indispensable component of social governance. The reason: corruption in China, like in any other country, distorts the allocation of State resources leading to inequality of opportunity which breeds political and social discontent.

The anti-corruption drive, aimed at both high-level "tigers" and lower-level "flies", has drawn a mixed response. While some are not optimistic about it, others call it an encouraging beginning in a fight that will be a long one because of the sheer complexity of the issue. To get the right perspective, we need to analyze the larger picture.

To begin with, China is battling with two types of corruption-political corruption (corruption in various levels of the State) and commercial bribery-and sometimes it is very difficult to differentiate between the two. For instance, some observers say political corruption in the post-reform era started when undervalued State assets were transferred to the private sector and the scramble for windfall profits commenced with privatization.

Xi probably wanted to stress this aspect of corruption when he targeted the rampant collusion between some officials and businesses. At a meeting, he reminded some officials from Jiangsu province of a Chinese proverb, "the friendship of a gentleman is as insipid as water", implying that officials should not collude with businesses for personal or official gains.

Closely related to this aspect of corruption is another practice in China that allows Party officials to become business executives in State-owned enterprises which leads to conflicts of interests.

Second and more importantly, the various post-reform decentralization measures over the last three decades have led to powerful local-level coalitions, where overlapping responsibilities and asymmetric information sharing among various administrative units have created a situation where the central leadership's political message to fight corruption is not enough to neutralize vested interests. No wonder, Premier Li Keqiang once said: "It is more difficult to stir vested interests than stir a soul."

Third, the fiscal recentralization after 1994 and the subsequent withdrawal of agricultural tax had a major impact on local politics. On the one hand, the revenues of local governments were reduced; on the other hand, the burden of local officials was increased. The deliverable for local officials seems to be economic governance, which is achieved through economic growth, but by gradually infusing "social governance" components to evaluate performance, the higher authorities have put immense political pressure on local officials.

Sandwiched between reduced revenues and greater responsibilities, local officials are forced to use the transfer of land-use rights and connections with private businesses to generate funds for local causes. Therefore, more teeth are needed to fight corruption through institutional measures such as linking posts with performance, especially in terms of promotions, rewards and punishments. The idea should be to convey to local officials that for the people better quality of life is as important as higher individual incomes.

Keeping in view the above challenges, the anti-corruption drive initiated by the leadership headed by Xi has been reasonably successful. Critics who say the anti-corruption drive is nothing more than a cosmetic change with "big thunder and small rain" should realize that a beginning had to be made somewhere, and although the drive has a long way to go, it indeed is a bold step forward.

Besides, the anti-corruption drive has led to the arrests of some very high-level officials and senior executives, including one from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and some of the major SOEs. And in some cases, the action has been prompt. For example, Lei Zhengfu, Party secretary of a district in Chongqing, was removed within 60 hours of exposure in Internet chat rooms.

Whether it is an anti-corruption drive or environmental governance, fruitful outcomes cannot be achieved through only political objectives and carrot-and-stick policies. For fruitful results, one also has to measure the extent to which local officials make innovative use of their "creative spaces" in the political structure to improve the quality of people's lives in their respective constituencies.

The author is assistant professor of humanities and liberal arts at the Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, India, and a visiting fellow at the BRICS Center of Fudan University in Shanghai.