Update strategic balance

US and China should work out new agreements on the Taiwan question to avoid conflicts and satisfy various parties

US arms sales to Taiwan have long been a major question challenging Sino-US relations. Although China and the US issued a joint communiqu regarding this question as early as 1987, they have never agreed about its interpretation. As a result, no true solution has been secured.

While the US has slowed or suspended its sale of some heavy military equipment, including F-16C/D fighters, to Taiwan, it is still of pressing urgency to secure a solution acceptable to Washington and Beijing.

Since the question involves the strategic interests of three parties - the Chinese mainland, the US and Taiwan - a solution should consider, first of all, the rebalancing of strategic interests and the maintenance of their smooth and steady development.

As far as the strategic interests and goals are concerned, the three differ completely from each other.

For the Chinese mainland, the return of Taiwan to the motherland through peaceful unification is its unshakable mission and strategic goal. Since the US arms sales are detrimental to achieving this, it will definitely stop or limit these activities as much as possible.

On the other hand, for the US such arms sales bring economic returns and demonstrate to the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and other East Asian countries its ability and resolve to balance the region's strategic forces. As for the Taiwan authorities, the weapons deals signify essential US support, cement their position among other political forces on the island and enhance their position and leverage in political contact with the mainland.

Obviously, the current situation pleases none of the parties involved, nor is it the product of any strategic gaming or balancing between them. For the purposes of achieving a new balance in relations between the three parties at the earliest date possible, removing the major obstacle blocking the advancement of Sino-US relations and securing the long-term development of cross-Straits relations, three different options could be available for a solution to the arms sales problem.

The best option is to bring into place a mechanism of mutual military trust between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan through contact and consultation, so as to arrive at an understanding of the arms sale issue. One benefit of this option is that it addresses the interests of all three parties through negotiation: the key strategic interest of the Chinese mainland would be satisfied, political burdens on the Taiwan authorities would be greatly reduced and the US would preserve its strategic interests in East Asia. It may also lead to a permanent solution to the Taiwan question, which has troubled Sino-US relations for many years.

There is one prerequisite, however, for the execution of this option: political dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. The key problem with this is that present conditions are not yet ripe for such talks. As the situation stands, it is not enough to just have some cross-Straits political consultations, or come to one or two agreements.

The second option is for China and the US to balance their strategic interests through links other than the Taiwan question. For the Chinese mainland, any balancing of strategic interests that does not involve the Taiwan question will be a painful choice because it effectively means China has acquiesced in the separation of Sino-US relations from the relations between the US and Taiwan; in Taiwan's upgrading of its military equipment through constant arms shipments from the US; and in Taiwan's gradual localization of arms production through technical cooperation with the US. This type of strategic interest balancing has already been proven to be unstable and constantly vulnerable to disturbance and disruption from various kinds of frictions and conflicts.

The third choice is a middle path that explores new solutions such as securing US commitment - for example, through the issuance of joint communiqus or a Sino-US swap of strategic interests - to exercise fairly close control of arms sale to Taiwan and to stop selling fighters, warships, submarines or other heavy military equipment to the island.

This model is borrowing experience from the one used to solve the Hong Kong question decades ago, when a joint declaration was issued by China and Britain to confirm the relations between the colony and London. One benefit of this option, via direct strategic dialogues, is the discovery and finalization of a new point for balancing the strategic interests of China and the US, translating potentially to a subsequent settlement of major Sino-US disputes.

As the two countries come increasingly closer to each other in terms of strength or become strategically more dependent on each other, execution of this option will become all the more likely. But, because the US administrative system is subject to the influence of Congress, actual execution of this would hinge on its say about any joint communiqus.

In view of China's national interests, the first option is the most rewarding, while the second leads to strategic retreat and compromise. However, if real strength and actual conditions are studied together, the third option is the most feasible in the current period because any new political agreement between China and the US will signify one more strategic step forward by China.

At a time when sudden and rapid changes sweep across the globe and the strength of many countries fluctuates drastically, developing and securing a more stable and more positive relationship with China is also in the practical interests of the United States.

As for questions involving Taiwan, especially when arms sales are concerned, achieving a new understanding is the best way to develop a win-win Sino-US relationship. Such a new understanding should rise above that of the 1987 communiqu, of course.

Having witnessed 24 years of changes and developments, the crucial issue is for China and the US to locate their new point of strategic balance.

The author is researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

(China Daily 09/29/2011 page8)