Tensions have repeatedly flared across the Taiwan Straits over the past few years, and the prospect of further hostilities cannot be completely ruled out. What, then, is the future of cross-Straits relations?

This question not only touches a raw nerve with Chinese people living on both the mainland and in Taiwan, but has also drawn international attention. The mainland advocates constructive dialogue and negotiations as a means of ensuring long-term peace and stability.

It also calls for mutually beneficial exchanges in every field so that the union of the Chinese nation can be achieved by talking and working together. This is in the best interests of the Chinese people, as well as being conducive to stability and prosperity in East Asia and the Pacific Region.

But the relationship is, after all, a matter that concerns both sides. Without responses or efforts at co-ordination, even the best intentions will struggle to reach fruition.

In any discussion of the cross-Straits relationship, clear definitions of "cross-Straits" and "cross-Straits relationship" need to be established.

"Cross-Straits" is a commonly accepted term that refers to the mainland region governed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Taiwan region governed by the Taiwan administration. The PRC government holds that the cross-Straits relationship is one between two regions within China's territory.

But diverging views exist in Taiwan: Some see the relationship as one between two regions inside "the Republic of China" (ROC), while some maintain that it is "a special state-to-state relationship". Others still put forward the notion of "one side, one country".

However, this last perspective runs counter to the "constitution" currently in effect in Taiwan, the legal codes of Taiwan's criminal law and civil law, the map used in Taiwan and Taiwan's administrative partition, all of which undeniably support the concept of "two regions inside one country". The "special state-to-state relationship", or "one side, one country" stance, is not only opposed by 1.3 billion people on the mainland, but also directly contradicts Taiwan's own "constitution".

For all the absurdity of Chen Shui-bian's theory of "one side, one country", the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration has kept to the "one China" framework. Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, former DPP chairman, has acknowledged that "the ROC constitution has a one-China framework".

Therefore, the cross-Straits relationship is not one between two countries and, compared with a typical international relationship, it is not constrained by international laws or international organizations.

But until unification takes place, the cross-Straits relationship does not constitute a conventional relationship between the central government and a local government within one country. Historically, Taiwan was a province ruled by China's central government. But this was in the past. When both sides are unified under a "One Country, Two Systems" structure, Taiwan will become a special administrative region under China's central government. That will be in the future. For the present, there is no authoritative agency on either side that can subject the relationship to its leadership. In terms of a legal and political framework, neither side is subordinate to the other. Even though both sides have long claimed to represent the central government and regarded one another as a local government, such assertions are the opinion of one side, which is not accepted by the other.

To sum up, the cross-Straits relationship can be described as one between two systems within China's territory, neither of which is politically or legally subordinate to the other.

Such an understanding can be crystallized in two terms: "one China" and "mutual non-subordination". The problem is, neither side is ready to accept both terms, and each simply lays emphasis on one or the other as befits their stance. The Taiwan administration stresses "mutual non-subordination" while opposing "one China", but the mainland prefers "one China" and eschews "mutual non-subordination". There is, therefore, no consensus.

To resolve this dilemma, both sides will have to adjust their way of thinking and give some consideration to the outlook of the other side.

For the Taiwan administration, the important thing is to acknowledge and accept the "one-China" principle. Of course, its expression of "one China" will be different from that understood by the mainland. Thus, even though Taiwan is not united with the mainland, China's sovereignty is not undermined - both sides of the Taiwan Strait are parts of China, and Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the entire Chinese people. This is a hard fact. "Unification" does not involve sovereignty; that issue was resolved when Japan returned Taiwan's sovereignty to China in 1945. In addition to the "promotion of unification", what is needed now is the "prevention of independence". And the fight against independence is becoming increasingly intense all the time. Our insistence upon the one-China principle argues that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the entire Chinese people and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

The mainland, meanwhile, should fully understand that the current Taiwan administration has been elected by its citizens. The mainland should recognize the fact that, while adhering to the "one China" principle, neither side is "subordinate", legally or politically, to the other. And it should seek ways in its policy pronouncements and legal and political statements to naturally link the two terms. The "promotion of unification" should deal with the legal and political non-subordination that has existed over the past half century. And to resolve this issue, one must be practical and face reality.

On October 14, 1998, Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, told the visiting chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, Koo Chen-fu, that "there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is a part of China. Even though China is not yet unified, both sides should strive for it under the principle of 'one China' and on an equal footing. A nation's territory and sovereignty should not be split, and Taiwan's political status should be discussed under the premise of 'one China'".

To dissect this statement, "not yet unified" is an acknowledgement of the current status. For the rest, there are three layers of implications. First, Beijing consents to Taiwan having "political status"; of course this "political status" should be "appropriate". Second, Beijing does not define Taiwan as "a province in rebellion"; if the relationship is one of superior vs. subordinate, there would be no "equal footing", and if Taiwan is "a province in rebellion", there would be no talks and negotiations. Third, the political status of the Taiwan administration should be discussed "under the premise of one China"; in other words, it should not harm the sovereignty that China has over Taiwan.

Subsequently, on several occasions, the mainland has reiterated that "Taiwan's political status can be discussed". As late as 2002, the then Communist Party's General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, in delivering his political report for the 16th National Party Congress, reviewed "the three points that can be discussed", specifically, "how to formally end cross-Straits hostility; how to define the Taiwan region's international capacity for economic, cultural and social manoeuvring (in a way) that is compatible with its status; and how to determine the political status of the Taiwan administration".

This proves that the mainland has begun contemplating the concept of legal and political "mutual non-subordination".

This concise review illustrates that the mainland is appealing to Taiwan to return to the "1992 consensus", while at the same time it fine-tunes its policies to better accommodate Taiwan's concern for "mutual non-subordination". The Taiwan administration, on the other hand, while sticking to "mutual non-subordination", has moved even further away from the "one-China" principle, clearly reflecting which side is more sincere about ameliorating cross-Straits relations.

Huang Jiashu is a professor of international relations at Beijing's Renmin University of China

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